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Extant studies on tax morale emphasize the influence of reciprocal motivations on tax 
compliance behavior. This strand of literature views tax payments as a tax contract between 
governments and citizens, arguing that individuals’ willingness to pay taxes depends on 
their perceptions of government’s representation. This paper examines whether a reciprocal 
information can affect individuals’ tax morale in an authoritarian regime featured by low-
information environments with an original survey experiment of 119 respondents in China. 
I primed a subgroup of respondents with information about congressional representation 
unfolding at local levels, and compared their tax morale to the untreated group. The results 
show that this information affects people’s willingness to pay taxes in an unexpected 
direction. I find evidence that those who received the representation information tended to 
have lower tax morale than those who did not receive the information. This is because this 
information undermined congress delegates’ representation perceived by the treated units, 
which in turn diminished their willingness to pay taxes. Following the baseline result, three 
heterogeneous effects were tested. I find that the negative effect of information on tax 
morale is larger among MBA group. I also find some evidence that the treatment effect is 
stronger among low self-monitors, who incline to express their real attitudes toward 
sensitive questions such as tax compliance. Yet, I do not find evidence that political 
 v 
 
knowledge plays a role in the heterogeneous effect. Last, I offer some suggestive evidence, 
both quantitative and qualitative, of why the reciprocal information lowered, not enhanced, 
people’s perceptions of local congress delegates’ representation. 
 vi 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Existing literature on tax compliance has identified that compliance behavior is not only a function 
of tax rates, penalty, and probability of detection, but also a function of individuals’ willingness to 
pay taxes. Scholars have proposed the term Tax morale in reference to this willingness. However, 
even if survey-based and experimental research have offered some evidence that favorable tax 
morale encourages people’s compliance behavior, we still know little about the factors that foster 
tax morale itself. This paper contributes to tax morale literature by examining whether or not 
Chinese citizens are more willing to pay taxes, measured by attitudes toward tax compliance, if 
they are informed that local congress delegates have become more representative than before. This 
tax morale channel is known as reciprocal motivation, meaning that citizens tend to be more 
willing to pay taxes if they feel that their interests are represented or responded by the government.  
To examine reciprocal motivation, this paper introduces an original survey experiment in 
China. I randomly primed a subgroup of respondents with the information on congressional 
representation recently unfolding in China’s local congresses and asked a battery of questions 
regarding one’s tax morale. Since randomization ensures that there would be no systematic 
differences in the pretreatment covariates (both observable and unobservable) held by subjects 
across groups at the outset of the survey, the treatment effect can be identified by a simple 
difference-in-means test between the treatment and control group concerning their tax morale. 
Tax compliance is a vital issue in both academic and policy arenas. On the one hand, 
taxpayer behavior is one of the classical topics in the research of development economics. On the 
other hand, particularly in developing countries, taxation matters a lot as to state-building and 
economic development. But, “almost by definition, developing country governments do not have 
enough money” (Morrison, 2015: 1) since they often lack sufficient capacities to enforce tax 
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extraction. Thus, from a policy perspective, it is important to understand what factors could affect 
citizens’ willingness to comply with the tax law. 
Previous works have attributed compliance behavior to two broad factors: deterrence and 
tax morale. The former was built on the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, in which taxpayers 
choose how many incomes would be reported to tax authorities by trading-off the benefits (lower 
payments) and costs (the risk of being detected) of evasion. In other words, compliance decisions 
are entirely determined by economic factors. Experimental evidence, however, indicated that this 
model does not capture the whole story, as people’s actual compliance is often higher than the 
expected utility model would predict, even under weak enforcement conditions (Alm et al., 1992; 
Slemrod et al., 2001). This inconsistency suggests that deterrence is not the only factor that affects 
compliance (Elffers, 1991; Graetz and Wilde, 1985). 
Tax morale is used in reference to these non-deterrence factors, emphasizing that people’s 
intrinsic motivations to pay taxes also affect compliance behavior. As discussed in the following 
section, scholars have proposed several tax morale mechanisms through which tax compliance 
may be increased, such as fulfillment of civic duties (Dwenger et al. 2016), perceptions of state’s 
legitimacy (Levi, 1989), attitudes toward the fairness of tax systems (Feld and Frey, 2007), peer 
effects (Hallsworth et al. 2014), and so forth. In actuality, deterrence and tax morale are by no 
means mutually exclusive but may interact with each other, neither do tax morale mechanisms.  
There are at least two problems in the previous studies, however. First, as Luttmer and 
Singhal (2014: 166) have noted, most field studies of tax morale to date have been “one-shot” in 
nature. Specifically, to examine the relationship between tax morale and compliance behavior, 
these studies often began with a random assignment of interventions that aimed at priming treated 
participants’ motivations to pay taxes to the treated subjects, then comparing their compliance 
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behaviors to the untreated subjects. However, the casual chain from tax morale to compliance is 
not identified, as this kind of study failed to see the impact of the interventions on tax morale in 
the first place. Besides, even if survey-based studies have examined the determinants of tax morale 
(OECD, 2013), the relationships they found may not be causation but merely correlation. 
Moreover, numerous studies on tax compliance focused on European, Latin American, and African 
countries but little on the East Asian contexts. Hence, our understanding on individuals’ tax morale 
is still limited. 
This paper aims to address these issues and contributes to this body of literature on tax 
morale by focusing on the reciprocal mechanism. The theoretical foundation of reciprocity lies in 
tax contract theory in which paying taxes is viewed as a bargaining with governments by taxpayers. 
Taxpayers’ compliance with the tax law depends on their relationship with the government, and if 
they feel that government to some extents represent and respond to their interests, they will be 
more willing to pay taxes. Ostensibly, reciprocity seems not to operate in autocracies, as we 
conventionally only correlate representation to democracy. Nevertheless, scholars have recently 
found an increased congressional representation at the local level in China, showing that local 
congress delegates have attempted to respond to personal contacts and advocated the local 
government for local public services (Manion, 2014; 2016). This political change renders this 
paper an opportunity to prime Chinese citizens’ reciprocal motivations with information about 
congressional representation and to see whether or not people’ tax morale will be affected by it. 
The experimental results show that the representation information affected people’s tax 
morale in an unexpected way: The informed respondents tended to have lower tax morale relative 
to the uninformed respondents. Put differently, the information executed a negative effect on tax 
morale. The results show that, instead of increasing informed respondent’ perceived representation 
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of local congress delegates, the information diminished it, thus leading informed respondents to 
have lower tax morale. Next, I test three heterogeneous effects, finding some evidence that the 
treatment effect is larger among MBA respondents and low self-monitors, who incline to reveal 
their actual attitudes toward tax compliance. By contrast, no evidence suggested that one’s political 
knowledge plays a role in the test of heterogeneous effect. Last, I provide some tentative answers 
to why the intervention reduced people’s perceptions of congress delegates’ representation. I argue 
that the surveyed respondents on average considered the information is from the government 
and/or did not trust the information. In the meantime, the information has already primed their 
ideal of reciprocity, thus lowering their perceptions of local congress delegates’ representation. I 
offere some qualitative and quantitative evidence to support this argument. 
It also merits noting that the outcome variable in this paper is not behaviors but reported 
attitudes toward compliance. Of course, the attitudes that respondents revealed in a survey may 
not accurately reflect their actual behavior when faced with the real consequence of tax evasion 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977), and this drawback could explain why scholars begin conducting large-
scale field experiments to look at real taxpayer behavior (Mascagni, 2016). However, to establish 
the causal mechanism behind the effect of tax morale on compliance decisions, we must 
understand what factors foster people’s tax morale in the first place. While most tax experiments 
failed to examine this question, this paper aims to fill in this gap. 
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews extant studies on tax compliance. 
Chapter 3 discusses the tax contract theory, institutional environment in China, and tested 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 introduces the research design, including experimental intervention, pretest 
results, experimental setup, and outcome variables. Empirical results were reported in Chapter 5. 
This paper then provides some quantitative and qualitative evidence to interpret the experimental 
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findings in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes the paper by summarizing the finding and proposing 




CHAPTER 2: WHY COMPLY? 
2.1 Deterrence 
Existing literature on tax compliance has ascribed compliance decisions to deterrence (economic 
factors) and tax morale (noneconomic factors). This section reviews the two broad categories of 
factors. Deterrence is the first well-recognized determinant of tax compliance. Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) applied the Becker (1968) model of economic crime to the tax compliance context. 
The underlying logic of this model is that individuals’ compliance decisions are determined by the 
expected utility to tax evasion, which is decided by tax rates, the probability of being detected, and 
the amount of penalty to be paid if found guilty. The first generation of tax experiments was 
concerned with testing this expected utility model. Friedland et al. (1978) utilized a lab experiment 
of 15 Israeli psychology students, finding that if tax rates rose above a certain threshold (in their 
findings, from 25% to 50%), a striking increase in the probability of underreporting income, as 
well as the degree of underreporting, could be observed. Besides, for deterring evasion, large fines 
were found to be more effective than frequent audits. Later, Spicer and Thomas (1982) further 
advanced the deterrence theory by launching a lab experiment of 54 students, finding that the 
relation between deterrence and compliance is empirically valid when people have full information 
about that the probability of detection. In Beck, Davis, and Jung (1991)’s lab experiment of 112 
students, they also found supporting evidence that, on the one hand, evasion is lower when the 
audit probability is higher, and that, on the other hand, the lack of information weakens this 
opposite effect.   
At the same time, there is ample experimental evidence against the expected utility model. 
Scholars have claimed that the model puts too much weight on economic factors, thus failing to 
explain the actual level of compliance observed in real-world conditions, which is often higher 
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than predicted by the model. Graetz and Wilde (1985) first challenged the idea that evasion would 
have disappeared had tax rates been lower. Alm, et al. (1992) then in the lab found that people pay 
taxes because they value public provisions and tend to exhibit much diversity in their tax behaviors. 
Alm et al. (1999) then showed that voting on different aspects of a fiscal system change 
individuals’ social norms, which seem to have predictable effects on compliance decisions. 
Slemrod et al. (2001) also noted that the impact of deterrence is not universal but conditional on 
taxpayers’ income levels.   
The early tax experiments have prompted scholars to search for non-deterrence factors that 
fall outsides the expected utility model but may affect compliance. In fact, Allingham and Sandmo 
also acknowledged that their compliance model could be criticized for giving too little attention to 
non-deterrence factors. More important, the early compliance experiments, whether siding with 
the expected utility model or not, own a common weakness: they often used students as the subject 
pool, which may be inappropriate. Even if students will respond to the incentives set out in the lab, 
they have no actual experience in paying taxes. My experiment avoids this pitfall by recruiting 
respondents who have had full-time working experiences and thus can be considered real 
taxpayers. 
2.2 Tax Morale      
Given that tax compliance scholars have recognized that expected utility of tax evasion is 
not the only cause of compliance behavior, they have attempted to understand why people have 
intrinsic motivations to comply with the tax law. Under this circumstance, tax morale has received 
lots of attention. Tax morale is defined as individuals’ own willingness to pay their tax payments 
(Torgler, 2007). Scholars have offered evidence, albeit mixed, that individuals’ attitudes toward 
tax compliance affect their compliance decisions. Here, the key question is what affects 
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compliance attitudes. Scholars have proposed several mechanisms through which tax morale 
operates (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). Below, this paper reviewes these mechanisms. 
First, individuals’ social norms, such as the feeling of pride and honesty, sense of civic 
duties, altruism toward others, and the inclination to avoid feeling guilty and/or shame, may affect 
their compliance behavior. Many Scholars have examined the influence of social norms by 
randomly sending letters/emails with moral suasion messages to taxpayers. The social norm effects 
were then estimated by comparing compliance behaviors between treated and untreated 
participants. To date, most experimental studies attempting to prime people’s social norms tended 
to find null effects. Blumenthal et al. (2001), for example, found little evidence that letters 
encouraging voluntary compliance can affect taxpayer behaviors in Minnesota. Torgler (2004) also 
found a weak and statistically insignificant effect of normative appeal messages on compliance 
behaviors in Switzerland. However, null effects do not necessarily mean social norms do not exert 
effects on compliance; instead, it may exist but is not elastic to a particular intervention/message. 
Second, tax compliance could also be affected by how others pay taxes, as people may 
want to conform to others’ behavior. Previous works on this peer effect have provided mixed 
evidence. For example, Fellner et al. (2013) randomly provided potential Australian evaders of TV 
license fees with information on others’ paying behavior but did not find a consistent and positive 
effect. The information, nevertheless, had a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion 
is seen as widespread. In Peru, Del Carpio (2014) showed that messages combining information 
on peer compliance and payment reminder only led to a small but insignificant increase in 
compliance. However, a study in the United Kingdom offered a different picture. Hallsworth et al. 
(2014) randomly gave a subgroup of participants one of three messages about peer compliance: 1) 
9 out of 10 people pay their tax on time; 2) 9 out of 10 people in the U.K. pay their tax on time; 
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and, 3) 9 out of 10 people in the U.K. pay their tax on time and you are currently in the very small 
minority of people who have not paid us yet. The authors found that all three messages had 
significant effects on compliance, though the strongest one is the last message. 
A small group of scholars has also identified long-term cultural effects on compliance 
behaviors. Cummings et al. (2009) examined compliance behavior of individuals from different 
cultural backgrounds when placed them in a similar environment. They utilized both survey and 
experimental data to buttress their contention that cross-cultural differences explained the observed 
compliance behavior. Halla (2012) provided an alternative strategy to investigate cultural effects. 
He exploited variations arising from individuals who resided in the same country but had varying 
countries of origin, finding that American-born individuals in the United States have higher tax 
morale when the country of their ancestry has higher average tax morale. Besides, he also 
concluded that tax morale seems to have a causal effect on the size of shadow economy.  
Last but not least, people’s willingness to pay taxes also depends on their relationship with 
governments. This paper uses the term reciprocity about this broad situation. When it comes to 
paying taxes, citizens consider tax payments as signing a contract between governments and 
themselves in exchange for public services. Citizens’ compliance behaviors then are motivated by 
this reciprocal relationship with governments. Scholars have proposed several manners relating to 
this reciprocal motivation. For instance, citizens may be more compliant with the tax law if they 
feel active in the decision-making process (Feld and Tyran, 2002; Lü and Tsai, 2016), when they 
perceive the state as legitimate (Levi, 1989), when they have positive attitudes toward government 
institutions (Torgler, 2005), or when they feel the tax authorities fairly treat them (Feld and Frey, 
2007). To sum up, all of these factors have indicated that compliance behavior embodies the 
psychological tax contract between governments and citizens. 
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To date, experimental evidence regarding reciprocal motivations has found mixed results. 
Scholars have attempted to prime individuals’ reciprocal motivations with information on the uses 
of tax revenues. For example, Blumenthal et al. (2001) described the types of social programs on 
which tax revenues are spent in letters randomly given to taxpayers in Minnesota. Castro and 
Scartascini (2013) randomly gave taxpayers in Argentina the information about specific public 
goods in their community. Dwenger et al. (2016) included messages, in which local German 
church tax revenues fund work in the parish, in a letter randomly assigned to citizens. None of 
them found any significant effect of this type of information on compliance behavior. By contrast, 
Bott et al. (2014) and Hallsworth et al. (2014) found some evidence that the informed taxpayers 
seem more compliant with the tax law if the received information highlighted the breakdown of 
the public expenditures. From a different angle, Lü and Tsai (2016) found that Chinese people tend 
to comply with property taxes if they have a chance to participate in the design of a new tax law.1 
Even though this paper also focuses on reciprocity, it differs from the previous works in 
three fundamental ways. First, most reciprocity studies adopted one-shot interventions to examine 
whether reciprocity could encourage people’s compliance behavior. However, the casual process 
from compliance attitudes to compliance practices may not be identified if we do not see whether 
the interventions relating to reciprocity indeed improve people’s tax morale in the first place. This 
paper intends to examine this dynamic process by investigating whether a reciprocal information 
affects tax morale. Second, existing studies on reciprocity often focused on democratic regimes 
                                                
1 Although Lü and Tsai (2016) also examines the effect of reciprocal motivations on tax morale, this paper is different 
from them in two fundamental ways. First, their conjoint analysis focuses on citizens’ participation, not government 
institutions’ representation and officials’ responsiveness. Second, when mentioning tax morale, they focus on people’s 
attitudes toward property tax compliance. By contrast, this paper does not target any specific type of taxes but intends 
to provide a more general picture. Related, Lü, Queralt, and Kao (2016) conducted two survey experiments in China 
and Taiwan focusing on the effect of information about tax burden on the demand for government accountability. 
Even if that project also examines the relation between taxation and representation, the outcome variable of interest is 
not tax morale, which is the focus of this paper. 
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but little on authoritarian regimes (exceptions are de la Cuesta, 2015; Lü and Tsai, 2016; Lü, 
Queralt, and Kao, 2016). Likewise, most studies looked at European, Latin American, and African 
contexts but little at the East Asian context. This paper contributes to this literature by focusing on 
an authoritarian regime in East Asia. Third, this paper primes taxpayers’ reciprocal motivations 




CHAPTER 3: THEORY 
3.1 Tax Contract Between Governments and Taxpayers 
The theoretical framework of reciprocity lies in the tax contract theory in which citizens consider 
paying taxes as an establishment of contractual relationships between governments and 
themselves. In line with this reasoning, taxpayers who feel that governments represent their 
interests are expected more willing to pay taxes. This theory has deep roots in early modern Europe 
where monarchs were compelled to relinquish some of their power to legislative institutions in 
exchange for the ability to raise new taxes (Moore, 2004). As Tilly (1990: 64) noted, representative 
institutions in the case of England were the outcome of bargaining with the subject population for 
the wherewithal of state activity, especially the means of war. Initially, Kings of England did not 
want a representative institution to form; however, to raise more tax revenues for warfare, they 
conceded to barons, then to clergy, gentry, and the bourgeoisie. This is where the notion no-
taxation-without-representation comes from. In addition, the relationship between taxation and 
representation is confirmed by the resource curse literature, in that autocrats could avoid pressures 
to implement representative institutions if they can finance themselves with non-tax revenues from 
natural resources, such as petroleum (Ross, 2001). 
In the meantime, the contractual relationships between governments and citizens also 
involve public provisions. In Levi (1989)’s seminal work, she argued that citizens pay taxes in part 
because they perceive the government will deliver public services in return. From the perspective 
of governments, to make the link between tax payments and public provisions clearer, they have 
the incentive to establish legislative institutions for lowering compliance cost. Timmons (2005) 
lends statistical evidence to support this idea, showing that countries with higher proportion of 
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revenues from personal income and corporate taxes have better property protection rights while 
countries relying more on regressive taxes have higher social spending.  
In sum, according to tax contract theory, reciprocity has two interrelated components: To 
encourage individuals’ willingness to pay taxes before the due date, on the one hand, it is important 
to make taxpayers feel that the government put efforts into representing citizen interests. On the 
other hand, taxpayers need to perceive that government officials play a role in delivering public 
services deemed critical to citizens. Clearly, this theory is psychological in nature.  
3.2 Representation in China? 
Conventional wisdom holds democracy to be a necessary condition for meaningful 
representation and thus, “it will be difficult to think of a psychological tax contract in autocratic 
regimes” (Feld and Frey, 2007:107). In contemporary authoritarian countries, even if the existence 
of legislative institutions has become more common than before, and many of them are more than 
window dressing (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009), scholars rarely contended that 
these legislatures perform representation. The scenario seems worse in the Chinese case: congress 
delegates have long been disparaged as “rubber stamps” and only shake hands ceremoniously, clap 
hands at speeches by government leaders, and raise hands to ratify executive decisions in the 
plenary session every March. 
However, things have changed recently. Scholars have started to argue that China’s 
congresses are undergoing a substantial change regarding delegates’ representation. For example, 
based on observational data, Truex (2016) found that provincial congress delegates have become 
more willing to address issues deemed most serious by the constituents they claim to represent. 
For nonpolitical issues, provincial congress delegates have proposed policies that greatly reflect 
the constituent interests, and sometimes, these proposals embody public provisions. Why the 
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Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attempted to increase congressional representation? Truex (ibid.: 
5) argued that the autocrat in China has the incentive to stay in power and thus must placate citizens 
by providing a minimal standard of welfare; but at the same time, the CCP has limited information 
about citizen interests. To better understand people’s preferences, the party therefore intentionally 
increased congressional representation. 
Perhaps more relevant to this paper, Melanie Manion (2016) also found local congresses 
have gradually become more representative (municipal, county, and township level) after the CCP 
passed a new election law in the late 1990s that legalized direct elections of local congresses. Since 
current local congress delegates are nominated and elected by citizens, they have the incentive to 
be representatives. By a large number of interviews and a 5000 local congress delegates survey, 
Manion pointed out that the delegates frequently used such terms as voting districts, constituency, 
and constituent interests. Moreover, most of them viewed themselves as representatives and thus, 
should side with their geographic constituents. More important, it has become more common than 
before to see that delegates take an initiative to advocate the local government for public services, 
such as road building, irrigation system, environmental protection, and social order maintenance. 
This paper exploits the increased congressional representation to examine the relationship 
between reciprocity and tax morale. Since I cannot manipulate congresses’ level of representation, 
the survey experiment intends to prime people’s reciprocal motivations with information about 
congressional representation unfolding in local congresses. I argue that this particular information 
treatment is suitable to the Chinese case based on two reasons. First, even though congresses have 
become more representative and responsive than before (relatively), most people may not possess 
this political information or are unaware of this change. As mentioned, both the National and Local 
People’s Congress were often described as a “rubber stamp” by critics since the 1950’s, as the 
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CCP is so dominant in the political system that it made this governing institution powerless. Hence, 
most citizens may not have intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the congressional system, 
let alone delegates’ representative actions. As Shi and Kong (2006) have noted, ordinary people’s 
lack of interest may stem from the relatively closed nature of the political system and the lack of 
meaningful electoral accountability. Meanwhile, people often treat politics as a distant entity and 
may not have the incentive to understand it. In short, this paper argues that people’s knowledge of 
congressional representation is inhibited by China’s inherent low-information environment. Thus, 
using information to prime individuals’ reciprocal motivations seems an ideal approach, especially 
in countries with a low information environment.  
On the other hand, the reasons the information to be used is about representation in local 
congresses, rather than national or provincial congresses are two-fold: First, local congress 
delegates are expected to perform greater representation than the national counterparts because 
only the former need to be nominated and elected to be delegates. Second, citizens arguably much 
easier perceive local congresses’ representation, as they are geographically closer to them than 
delegates from national and/or provincial congresses. In sum, by using local congress delegates as 
the subject in the vignette, it may offer a relatively strong treatment as to priming participants’ 
reciprocity in the survey experiment. 
3.3 Hypothesis 
This paper exploits taxpayers’ deficient information about congressional representation in 
China, testing whether people’s attitudes toward tax compliance (i.e. their tax morale) will change 
after receiving the representation information. The baseline hypothesis to be tested is about 
reciprocal motivation. According to tax contract theory, individuals are more willing to honestly 
report their incomes to the tax authority and pay taxes before the due date if they feel government 
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institutions to some extents represent and respond to citizen interests and deliver public services 
deemed as important by ordinary citizens.  If this psychological tax contract theory is correct, the 
observable implication is that: 
• H1: Individuals who were informed that local congress delegates have become more 
representative and responsive than before and have advocated local governments for 
public services should have higher tax morale than those who were uninformed.  
The causal parameter to be estimated is representation information, and the coefficient sign is 
expected to be positive. However, it also merits noting that this hypothesis implicitly assumes that 
the informed respondents trust the authenticity of the received message. By contrast, if people do 
not believe or trust the message, the intervention may fail to render or, even worse, damage their 
reciprocal motivations. I elaborate this contention in the discussion section. 
 In addition to this baseline hypothesis, this paper also tests two heterogeneous effects. First, 
as mentioned, scholars have established that many citizens in developing and authoritarian regimes 
rarely possess a modicum of information about government institutions and policies. However, it 
is inaccurate to say people’s political savvy is fixed in a given country; instead, some people may 
have better political knowledge than others because they are more well-educated and are more 
interested in politics. In view of this difference, this paper hypothesizes that the effect size of 
representation information is conditional on one’s political knowledge. If one is more aware of 
politics, she may have noticed the increased congressional representation and thus, the information 
may only bring a weak priming impact, and vice versa. The second hypothesis is thus: 
• H2: the effect of the representation information on tax morale should be larger among 
the respondents whose political knowledge is low, relative to the respondents with high 
political knowledge. 
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The casual parameter to be estimated is an interaction variable that interacts the treatment with a 
binary variable of low political knowledge. I will explain how to measure and generate this variable 
in the following section. The expected sign of the coefficient is positive, meaning that the treatment 
effect is stronger for the respondents with low political knowledge. 
 The other heterogeneous effect to be tested is about the self-monitoring scale (SM). It is 
based on the assumption that individuals differ in the degree to which they actively monitor and 
regulate their interpersonal behavior in response to social context (Gangestad and Snyder, 2000). 
Thus, high self-monitors are more likely than low self-monitors to accurately perceive and 
response to social cues by tailoring their attitudes and behavior to fit prevailing social expectations. 
That said, high self-monitors are less likely than low self-monitors to reveal their actual attitudes 
toward questions containing socially desirable answers. Since this experiment asked people’s 
compliance attitudes, the questions may be sensitive to people because socially desirable answers 
are present. Given that the variations in compliance attitudes should be larger for low self-monitors 
than for high self-monitors, the last tested hypothesis is thus: 
• H3: the effect of representation information on tax morale should be larger among the 
low self-monitors, relative to the effect among the high self-monitors. 
This heterogeneous effect could be tested by including an interaction variable interacting the 
treatment variable with the low-SM variable into the regression model, and the expected sign of 
coefficient should be positive, meaning that the positive treatment effect of representation 
information on tax morale is larger among the low self-monitors. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN 
Survey-based studies have shown that tax morale is positively correlated to people’s support for 
democracy, trust in government, and satisfaction with public services (OECD, 2013). Indeed, using 
data from the sixth-wave of World Value Survey, I find that people’s confidences in governments 
are positively correlated to their willingness to pay taxes (See Figure 1). However, this positive 
correlation may be spurious due to the endogeneity problem in observational data. 
To identify the causation, this paper introduces an original survey experiment of 119 
Chinese respondents. Randomized intervention averts selection bias (subjects are not self-selected 
into the intervention), balancing out the potential difference in pretreatment covariates across 
groups. Thus, when the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) is met,2 the average 
difference in outcome variables across groups could be attributed to the intervention. In this 
section, I discuss the information treatment, experimental setup, outcome measures, and other 
relevant variables necessary for testing heterogeneous effects.   
4.1 Treatment: information about representation in local congresses 
The treatment to be used for priming individuals’ reciprocal motivations is a text-based 
vignette in which information about congressional representation was provided. In this vignette, it 
contains two critical messages relating to the tax contract theory. First, the vignette informs the 
respondents that local congress delegates have become willing to respond to constituent interests 
and have played a greater role in delivering public services than before. Second, it also explains 
congress delegates’ incentives to represent citizen. In sum, the vignette aims to inform the treated 
                                                
2 A good discussion on the violation of SUTVA in the context of field experiment can be found in Gerber and 
Green (2012: 39-44). Morgan and Winship (2014: 48-52) provided a more general discussion about causal 
identification. 
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subjects of what local congress delegates are doing and why they are doing so. The message in the 
texted-based vignette is as follows: 
 
People’s Congresses are a fundamental government institution in China. Each year, local 
congress delegates meet at least once to discuss public policies. We want to let you know 
that, according to a recent survey of 5000 local delegates, local congress delegates become 
more willing to respond people’s interests in their locality. Besides, they also take an 
initiative to advocate local governments for offering public services deemed as important 
by local people, such as road, irrigation system, and social order. This is different than 
before in that congress delegates seldom delivered public services previously. But, now, 
since township and county congress delegates are nominated and elected in direct 
elections, they need to respond people to gain personal reputation. Yangzhou Municipal 
and Taizhou Wenling congresses are concrete examples. 
 
In this experiment, the treated subjects received a complete vignette as shown above, while 
the untreated subjects received the first two sentences of the vignette (People’s Congresses are a 
fundamental government institution in China. Each year, local congress delegates meet at least 
once to discuss public policies). In other words, holding the first two sentences constant, the only 
difference between the treated and untreated subjects is whether they will read the information 
about congressional representation (beginning with the sentence in bold font). As Gaines et al. 
(2007) have noted, many survey experiments do not include a control group in their research 
designs, and this paper recognizes this pitfall by including a baseline group.  
4.2 Pretest: the formulation of the texted-based vignette 
In formulating the text-based vignette and increase its internal validity, this paper has 
conducted a pretest before the core experiment. To begin, I had an informal online discussion about 
congressional representation with four graduate students and one Professor from the Central 
Europe University Business School in late September this year. This informal discussion facilitated 
the formulation of four different text-based vignettes (role perception, perceived responsibility, 
delegate activism, and elections incentive). Appendix A provides the wording for each vignette.  
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Next, on November 3, I launched an online pretest of 45 undergraduate students from the 
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. The respondents were told that they had to read 
four different text-based vignettes relating to local congress delegates in China, without informing 
them of the purpose of the pretest. After reading each vignette, they were asked what information 
a given vignette attempted to convey. The results show that (not reported) all four vignettes were 
quite successful in conveying the idea that local congress delegates have become willing to 
represent citizen interests. It also merits noting that I randomized the order in presenting the four 
vignettes to respondents to avoid order effects.  
Next, I asked respondents to rank the four vignettes based on how successful they think a 
given vignette conveys the information about congressional representation. As shown in Appendix 
B, these respondents on average viewed “delegate activism” as the most successful vignette for 
conveying the idea of representation. I then conducted a series of t-tests to examine if “delegate 
activism’s” mean is statistically different from others. Results show that (not reported) this is true 
by one-tailed t-test at the .05 significance level, even if the sample size is rather small (n=45). 
Meanwhile, if we conducted two-tailed t-test with the same significance level, “delegate 
activism’s” mean is still different from both “role perception’s” and “self-reported 
responsibility’s” mean. Yet it becomes statistically indistinguishable from “election incentive’s” 
mean. This may suggest that the “election incentive” vignette is also crucial in embodying people’s 
idea of representation.  
Finally, the pretest proposed open-ended questions to respondents before they left the 
survey (whether or not these messages made them feel that local congress delegates have become 
more willing to represent citizen interest; whether or not the messages reflect what is going on in 
China; what their general feedback is). These open-ended questions offered valuable information 
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for me to interpret the experimental findings. I will elaborate on this in the discussion section. In 
sum, this pretest helped me formulate the wording of the information in the text-based vignette 
and provided some qualitative information about how Chinese people perceived the representation 
information. Both of which benefited the research design and interpretation of experimental 
findings. 
4.3 Experimental Setup 
The experimental observations consist of 119 Chinese citizens who have had full-time 
working experience and thus can be treated as real taxpayers. I first built an online survey by 
Qualtrics and started to recruit respondents on November 12. The first group of respondents is 
from a Master of Business Administration (MBA) class at the Shanghai University of Finance and 
Economics. 36 respondents from the class completed the survey on November 12. The second 
group of respondents is from another MBA class at the Central European University Business 
School. 28 respondents from the class completed the survey on November 14. In total, MBA-type 
respondents constitute 64 respondents. Meanwhile, I was concerned with the small sample, thus 
starting to find more respondents on November 15. Since I did not have more MBA classes to use 
for this survey experiment, I decided to recruit non-MBA respondents. In doing so, my Chinese 
research partner and I sent the survey link to two WeChat Group Chats, whose members are 
university alumni. All respondents in the Group Chat voluntarily joined the survey, though we also 
incentivized them with a feature of WeChat Group Chat called “Grab the Red Package”. From 
November 15 to 17, 55 non-MBA respondents completed the survey. In total, this experiment 
consists of 119 recorded respondents.  
I employed block random assignment to enhance the precision of estimation, as the 
respondents in a given block are expected to have similar potential outcomes (Gerber and Green, 
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2014). In practice, as noted, I divided respondents into three groups and then adopted a complete 
random assignment in each block. The survey questionnaire can be found in Appendix C. As 
shown, all respondents first answered some demographic questions (gender, age, and occupation). 
Next, the treated subjects received the representation information while the untreated subjects did 
not, and both type of subjects then answered a manipulation check question. This question was 
used for checking whether the informed respondents were primed by the idea of representation 
(Do you think to what extent local congress delegates are willing to respond to ordinary people’s 
interests?). Later, a battery of question about tax morale, political knowledge and the SM scale 
were followed. Finally, respondents answered another set of demographic questions (party 
affiliation, monthly income, and residence location) before they left the survey. 
Relative to most tax experiments that used undergraduate and graduate students as the 
subject pool, respondents in this experiment are more suitable subjects to study tax-related issues. 
As for the MBA respondents, the admitted students must have full-time work experience for two 
years or longer. Using the MBA students from the Central Europe University Business School as 
an example, the majority has four- to five-years working experience. Provided that MBA students 
have had full-time working experience, they should have a better sense of paying taxes than normal 
students could have. As for the non-MBA respondents, the WeChat Group Chats eliminated the 
possibility of recruiting students into the experiment. According to the age and occupation 
variable, it is indeed the case. Appendix D provides the descriptive statistics of the demographic 
variables. 
4.4 Tax Morale, Political Knowledge and SM Scale 
The outcome variable of interest is individuals’ tax morale. This experiment proposes five 
tax-morale-related items, ACCOUNTABLE, REASONABLE, SERVICE, DISHONEST, and 
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ACCEPTABLE, to measure people’s attitudes toward paying taxes (Appendix C).3 The first four 
variables were measured on a seven-point Likert scale while the last one is a binary variable. In 
deciding the measurement of tax morale, I rely on Internal Revenue Service (IRS), World Value 
Survey (WVS), and Afrobarometer for the survey items. These items have been widely used in 
extant studies on tax morale (for example, Ali, et al. 2014; Cumming et al. 2009; Halla, 2012; 
OECD, 2013). Appendix D reports the descriptive statistics of the five tax morale variables. 
 To test the heterogeneous effects, I generate two variables that measure one’s political 
knowledge and SM propensity respectively. According to Zaller (1992), the best proxy of one’s 
political knowledge is neither by her education nor by her frequency of media use; instead, it is 
best measured by simple tests of neutral factual information about both domestic and international 
issues, as factual information is critical for intellectual engagement in politics. Thus, I propose six 
questions relating to one’s political savvy. Appendix C reports the knowledge questions used in 
the experiment. To determine whether one has high or low political knowledge, I first create a 
variable by aggregating all the six variables and then dichotomize it by the mean. Later, the 
heterogeneous effect can be tested by including an interaction variable that interacts the treatment 
variable with the binary knowledge variable. 
 As to the SM scale, this paper adopts Berinsky and Lavine (2007)’s measure to construct 
one’s SM scale. They revised the original items developed by Snyder and Gangstad (1986) with 
factor analysis and proposed six items to capture one’s SM scale. Berinsky and Lavine found that 
the first four items have the highest factor loadings and account for great variance. As Appendix 
                                                
3 By ACCOUNTABLE: Everyone who cheats on their taxes should be held accountable. By REASONABLE: 
People should just have to pay what they feel is a fair amount of taxes to governments. By SERVICE: Not honestly 
paying for the services they receive from government. By DISHONEST: Cheating on reporting actual profits to the 
tax authorities if having a chance. By ACCEPTABLE, it is either-or question: either (1) tax fraud is unacceptable 
under any circumstance. It is a matter of principle and fairness, or (2) fraud and taxes are inseparable, everyone 
evades taxes to some extent, and this is how the system is sustainable. 
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C shows, the six survey items are classified into two categories. First, positive-keyed items mean 
that in the traditional true/false response format of the scale, a response of “true” is indicative of 
high SM. Second, negative-keyed items mean that a response of “false” indicates high SM. I 
generate a new variable indicating whether one is high or low self-monitors through aggregating 
the six items and then dichotomize it by the mean. To test the heterogeneous effect relating to the 
SM scale, I create an interaction variable interacting the treatment variable with the binary variable. 
Since I expected the effect of representation information on tax morale is larger among low self-




CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This paper first checks whether or not the random assignment properly worked as expected by 
conducting a series of difference-in-means tests. In doing so, bivariate linear regression with robust 
standard error is employed. The result shows that all the pretreatment covariates are equally 
distributed across groups at 𝑝 ≥ .05. In addition, I conduct the same tests for MBA and non-MBA 
respondents, respectively, and the results remain intact at 𝑝 ≥ .10, which is not surprising given 
smaller sample. Last, I run three logistic regression models: Model 1 is for MBA respondents, 
Model 2 is for Non-MBA respondents, and Model 3 is for the pool data (Table 1). As reported, no 
pretreatment covariate is statistically correlated to the probability of receiving the treatment at 𝑝 ≥
.10. Figure 2 visualizes the results.  
This paper then checks that the manipulation worked as intended by seeing if ratings of 
local congress delegates as “willing to respond to ordinary people’s interests” were higher in the 
treatment group relative to the control group. The results are puzzling: Mean ratings decreased .21 
for the informed respondents relative to ratings for the uninformed respondents (𝑠𝑖𝑔 < .05). In 
other words, the ratings of local congress delegates’ perceived representation are lower in the 
treatment group than in the control group. The puzzle lies in the fact that the message, from 
citizens’ perspective, is a positive story but has led to many negative reactions. I provide a tentative 
account of why this occurred, along with some suggestive evidence, in the following section. 
Even though results from the manipulation check is not as expected, the treatment effect is 
consistent with the tax contract theory. Note that tax contract theory suggests that people’s tax 
morale depends on their perceptions of government representation. Since the representation 
information systematically damaged local congress delegates’ representation perceived by the 
informed subjects, we then should expect that the informed respondents have lower tax morale 
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relative to uninformed respondents. I find some evidence to support this hypothesis. As shown in 
Table 2, other than the DISHONEST variable, the coefficient signs of the intervention are 
consistently negative. More importantly, I find consistent evidence that the intervention reduces 
tax morale if ACCOUNTABLE and REASONABLE variables were used as the outcome measure 
( 𝑠𝑖𝑔 < .05 ). 4  If the ACCEPTABLE variable was adopted as the outcome measure, the 
intervention almost reaches the significance level of .10 to reject the null hypothesis. In sum, the 
results lend some support to the tax contract theory. When the information about representation 
damages local congress delegates’ representation perceived by the informed respondents, it then 
lowered the treated units’ tax morale afterward. Figure 3 visualizes the experimental results. 
Given this unexpected finding, this paper expects that the negative impact of representation 
information on tax morale should be more striking in the MBA group. The intuition is that many 
MBA respondents come from marketing, finance, or management industries and thus may have 
more chances to know and analyze both domestically and internationally socioeconomic issues. 
Meanwhile, they may also have more exposure to Western values and information about congress 
delegates during their working hours. Hence, the informed MBA respondents may be more likely 
to question the accuracy of the message. As discussed in the following section, many respondents 
in the pretest considered the message in the vignette as government’s propaganda; besides, some 
of them did not believe that local congress delegates have become more willing to represent and 
respond to ordinary citizens, as this does not fit their life-experiences. As noted above, if informed 
respondents do not trust the message, the representation information may prime their reciprocal 
motivations in an opposite direction-- the information lowers local congress delegates’ perceived 
representation owned by the informed respondents. 
                                                
4 The results are still robust even if a set of pretreatment covariates are included into the model. 
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I find some evidence to support this argument. I first examined the variable used for 
manipulation check among MBA respondents by an independent sample T-test with unequal 
variance, finding that the mean ratings decreased .53 for the informed respondents relative to the 
ratings for the uninformed respondents (𝑠𝑖𝑔 < .05). Clearly, the negative impact of representation 
information on perceived representation is larger among MBA respondents. Next, I run a multiple 
regression that regresses the outcome variables against the treatment and an interaction variable 
(Treated##MBA=1). As reported in Table 3, the coefficient sign of this interaction variable is 
negative and statistically significant when three (out of five) tax morale variables were used (𝑠𝑖𝑔 <
.10 for DISHONEST; 𝑠𝑖𝑔 < .05 for SERVICE; and 𝑠𝑖𝑔 < .01 for REASONABLE).  
The baseline results show that the informed respondents tended to have lower tax morale 
relative to their uninformed counterparts, as the representation information damaged congress 
delegates’ perceived representation. Here, it may merit giving some space to demonstrate how the 
statistical findings were changed as the sample size increased. As shown in Figure 4, first of all, 
most estimation becomes more precise if sample sizes increase from 64 toward 119. Related, if 
the sample size is 64, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the representation information has no 
effect on tax morale. As seen, for the two outcome variables, ACCOUNTABLE AND 
REASONABLE, the treatment effect could reach statistical significance only if the sample size 
were increased. In sum, statistical power matters in this survey experiment. 
This paper now checks H2 (political knowledge) and H3 (self-monitoring) about the 
heterogeneous effects. Initially, I expected the intervention would have larger effects on tax morale 
among the respondents with low political knowledge, as this subgroup of respondents may not 
notice the increased congressional representation and thus the information may render them greater 
reciprocal motivations, thereby leading to better tax morale.  
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However, now that I have found that information leads to lower local congress delegates’ 
perceived representation, I now expect that the negative effect of representation information on 
tax morale should be larger for respondents with high political knowledge, as they are expected 
more skeptical about government institutions and more likely to distrust the intervention (I will 
show why distrusting the message may lead to a negative priming effect in the following section). 
However, as Table 4 reports, there is no evidence that the effect size of representation information 
is conditional on one’s political knowledge. No matter what outcome variables are used, the 
coefficient signs are far from consistent. Besides, no estimates reach the conventional significance 
threshold. The results remain the same even if I look at MBA group only (not reported). In sum, I 
find no evidence that political knowledge plays a role in the test of heterogeneous effects. 
The other heterogeneous effect to be tested is one’s self-monitoring propensity. I expect 
the intervention should exert larger effect among the low self-monitors. Table 5 reports the results, 
showing that this is the case if I use REASONABLE and ACCETABLE as the outcome measure 
(𝑠𝑖𝑔 < .05). However, if ACCOUNTABLE, SERVICE, or DISHONEST are used as the outcome 
measure, the estimates are not statistically different from zero; besides, their coefficient signs are 
quite mixed. In short, even though I find some evidence that the negative effect of representation 
information is large for the low self-monitors, the results are mixed and need to be careful when 
one interprets them.  
In sum, this paper lends some evidence to support tax contract theory by showing that 
individuals’ reciprocal motivations affect their tax morale. Specifically, I randomly assigned the 
representation information to respondents in the experiment. Puzzlingly, I find that the informed 
respondents tended to have lower mean ratings than uninformed respondents when they were asked 
their perceptions of congressional representation. In other words, the information undermined, not 
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enhanced, local congress delegates’ perceived representation. Given this fact, I find some evidence 
that informed respondents tended to have lower tax morale than uninformed respondents. In what 
follows, this paper provides some suggestive evidence of why a positive message (local congress 
delegates become more willing to represent citizens) led to so many negative responses. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
Although this paper has found some evidence that individuals’ tax morale is influenced by their 
perceived representation of local congress delegates, it is still unclear why the intervention aiming 
at priming people’s reciprocal motivation turned out to “spoil” this motivation. I argue that the 
reason we observed this puzzling result is that respondents in the experiment on average suspected 
or even did not trust the message, either because they considered the information came from the 
CCP and was used for propaganda, or because the message in their views did not fit their real-life 
experiences. In the meantime, their reciprocal ideas have been primed-- i.e. the information may 
remind the informed respondents how not representative and responsive the current congressional 
system is. Thus, instead of increasing delegates’ perceived representation, the information 
backfired. This section offers four suggestive evidence to support this argument.  
 The first evidence comes from pretest results. As mentioned, in the pretest I presented some 
open-ended questions that tried to get some feedback from the respondents about the vignette. 
Although the subjects in the pretest are different from those in the core experiment, the feedback 
to some extent may still reflect how Chinese people are percevivng this information in specific 
and congressional representation in general. As to the feedback from the pretest, I find many 
respondents negatively considered the received message. Some viewed the message as CCP 
propaganda intended to convince citizens that the government has become more representative. 
Others explicitly mentioned that they suspect the authenticity of the messages, noting that the 
message induces them to believe that local congress delegates have become more representative, 
which in their views is not true. Still others mentioned that they rarely feel the existence of local 
congress delegates in their daily life so the message does not fit the reality. Last, many respondents 
noted that they do not trust the government’s propaganda and reports, considering local elections 
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to be opaque and fake even if the government keeps emphasizing the importance of the elections 
and the benefits citizens can get from them. 
 Even if the feedback from the pretest cannot represent the whole population, there are some 
similarities in the subject pool between the pretest and the core experiment. On the one hand, we 
can consider most respondents in both pretest and core experiment well-educated respondents who 
may be more skeptical about and critical to political and socioeconomic issues than less-educated 
respondents are. Hence, it may be unsurprising to see many pretest respondents bluntly mentioned 
that they do not trust CCP propaganda and be very skeptical about congressional representation at 
the local levels. On the other hand, most respondents in both pretest and core experiment come 
from Shanghai. Given a shared environment, they may perceive local congress delegates in a 
relatively similar way. In short, the feedback from the pretest offers some suggestive, indirect 
evidence that many respondents in the core experiment may think the information comes from the 
CCP and is used for propaganda.  Once they find that the messages do not fit reality, the priming 
effect may backfire; that is, the informed respondents may perceive congressional representation 
in a more negative manner than the uninformed respondents, who are not primed by the reciprocal 
message. 
 The next piece of suggestive evidence is from survey data about people’s different levels 
of trust between central and local governments. Specifically, people’s distrust of the information 
may be explained by the wording in which the intervention refers to local congresses and local 
governments, not to the NPC and the central government. People’s differences in trustworthiness 
between central and local government was first identified by Li (2004), who found in a survey of 
four counties from 1999 to 2001 that most Chinese citizens considered the central government as 
more trustworthy than local governments. Using the 2008 China Survey, a national and 
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representative dataset, I find an identical result. In the survey, it asked respondents how many 
confidences in central and local governments, respectively, they have. Table 6 clearly shows that, 
instead of seeing China as a monolithic country, citizens view the central and local governments 
separately, as they tend to have higher trust in the central government. Hence, in view of this 
difference, if the intervention used national, not local, congress delegates as the leading actors, the 
informed respondents may act differently. Of course, this is an empirical question and cannot be 
answered in this paper. 
 The third piece of evidence is drawn from the MBA respondents. As shown, I find some 
evidence that the adverse effect of representation information on people’s tax morale is larger 
among MBA respondents, as they are expected to be more sensitive to political and socioeconomic 
issues. To show this might be a valid explanation, I check the working histories of those current 
MBA students at the Central Europe University Business School. Its website details the breakdown 
of industry and function of their current students before they were admitted into the program. As 
reported in Figure 5, a great majority of these students were previously doing finance/accounting, 
general management, marketing/sales, and consulting, which may bolster their understanding of 
socioeconomic issues in both China and Western countries. For example, during their working 
hours, they may have more chances to collect and analyze domestic and international news for 
proposing better investment projects; they may also have more chances to go abroad for signing 
business contracts; moreover, they may have more chances to meet with Westerns, particularly 
because they are in Shanghai. All of these experiences may lead them to become more critical, 
sensitive, and skeptical about the information on congressional representation. Of course, this 
evidence is only suggestive; in addition, I did not have individual-level data to show whether 
respondents’ working histories affect their attitudes toward congressional representation. 
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The last possible explanation is about the saliency of congress elections when this survey 
experiment was conducted. In September 2016, a total of 454 members of the Liaoning province 
congress were relieved from their positions following widespread allegations of vote buying and 
bribery. Earlier this year, the CCP launched an investigation to look into this case, which has led 
to the ouster of former Liaoning provincial Communist Party head Wang Min from the party itself. 
This unusual event may negatively affect the informed respondents’ perceptions of the 
representation information, as the message stated that the reason local congress delegates attempt 
to represent citizen interests is that they need to build personal reputations to be nominated and 
elected in the next election. While, on average, this statement is not deceptive, the Lianning event 
may lead people to call it into question. 
In sum, this section offers some suggestive evidence of why the intervention lowered local 
congress delegates’ perceived representation. The puzzling findings may be explained by the fact 
that people did not trust the authenticity of the message while at the same time have been primed 
the reciprocal idea. Thus, the treated subjects’ perceptions of congress delegates’ representation 
tended to be lower relative to their uninformed counterparts. To offer firmer evidence, more works 




CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Do individuals’ reciprocal motivations affect their willingness to pay taxes? Tax contract theory 
has argued that individuals’ tax morale depends on their perceptions of government representation, 
holding other things constant. This psychological tax contract thus has contended that people tend 
to be more willing to comply with the tax law if they feel that government institutions attempt to 
represent and respond to their interests through public provisions. To examine whether or not this 
psychological mechanism is also operating in authoritarian regimes, this paper proposes a survey 
experiment of 119 respondents in China. 
 I find some evidence that information about the increased congressional representation 
indeed affected people’s attitudes toward tax compliance, a finding that supports the tax contract 
theory. However, what is not as expected is that the informed respondents tended to have lower, 
rather than higher, tax morale. I find consistent evidence that this is because the representation 
information lowered local congress delegates’ perceived representation. That is, the informed 
respondents tend to have lower mean ratings than the uninformed respondents when they were 
asked to what extent they think local congress delegate are willing to represent ordinary people’s 
interests. In addition to this baseline finding, this paper tests three heterogeneous effects. I find 
some evidence that the treatment effect is larger among MBA respondents and low self-monitors. 
Yet, I find no evidence that one’s political knowledge play a role in the heterogeneous effect. 
 Why did the intervention damage people’s perceptions of local congress delegates’ 
representation? I argue that this is because the respondents in the survey on average did not trust 
the received message. I offer some suggestive evidence to support this argument. However, more 
following-up experiments need to be done. First, to examine whether or not people’s trust in the 
information depends on the source of information, I may randomize the information providers to 
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see if people’s perception of a given information will change. Specifically, holding the information 
constant, I could randomly attach a name of the provider in the vignette, such as the CCP, an 
academic institute, or a commercial magazine, and then compare people’s perceptions of this 
particular message across different treatment conditions. Another possible follow-up experiment 
is to see whether or not an individual’s working experience has any conditional effect on tax 
morale. This may be the easiest issue to solve, as I could propose a new survey item about one’s 
working industry and function in the questionnaire for the next wave of this survey experiment. 
 The policy implication of this experimental study is that CCP’s propaganda may not always 
bring about what it planned and wanted. Even if the CCP has continued to emphasize how 
democratic and representative it has become in order to garner more regime supports, compared 
to the uneducated citizens, the well-educated citizens may not buy the argument.      
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Pretreatment Balance Test  
 Dependent Variable: Treated 
Independent Variables MBA Non-MBA Pooled 
Female -0.0183 0.509 0.264 
 (0.974) (0.387) (0.506) 
    
Age 0.0106 0.0286 0.0212 
 (0.897) (0.569) (0.581) 
    
CCP Membership -0.796 0.0662 -0.369 
 (0.139) (0.911) (0.344) 
    
Income Category -0.116 -0.204 -0.150 
 (0.296) (0.176) (0.101) 
    
Political Knowledge -0.0409 0.128 0.0506 
 (0.842) (0.582) (0.741) 
    
MBA   0.0527 
   (0.897) 
    
Constant 1.021 0.0121 0.286 
 (0.713) (0.994) (0.818) 
Observations 64 55 119 
p-values in parentheses 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
Table 2: Baseline Results: The Effect of Representation Information on Tax Morale 
 Dependent Variable 
 ACCOUNTABLE REASONABLE SERVICE DISHONEST ACCEPTABLE 
Treated -0.447** -0.540* -0.177 0.0866 -0.0509 
 (0.005) (0.016) (0.330) (0.233) (0.158) 
      
Constant 5.544*** 4.702*** 5.789*** 5.526*** 0.632*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 
p-values in parentheses 






Table 3: Heterogeneous Effect I: MBA Respondents 
 Dependent Variable 
 ACCOUNTABLE REASONABLE SERVICE DISHONEST ACCEPTABLE 
Treated -0.483+ -0.0569 0.235 0.312 -0.0556 
 (0.092) (0.732) (0.336) (0.133) (0.415) 
      
MBA 0.0481 0.207 0.726*** 0.507+ 0.144 
 (0.853) (0.276) (0.001) (0.053) (0.173) 
      
Treated## 
MBA 0.0632 -0.890
** -0.781* -0.432+ 0.00261 
 (0.802) (0.001) (0.013) (0.053) (0.968) 
      
Constant 5.519*** 4.593*** 5.407*** 5.259*** 0.556** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 
p-values in parentheses 





Table 4: Heterogeneous Effect II: Political Knowledge 
 Dependent Variable 
 ACCOUNTABLE REASONABLE SERVICE DISHONEST ACCEPTABLE 
Treated -0.647* -0.647+ 0.0588 0.118 -0.118* 
 (0.035) (0.070) (0.881) (0.540) (0.016) 
      
High_Know -0.766* 0.0627 0.499 0.357+ -0.0384 
 (0.030) (0.849) (0.243) (0.085) (0.543) 
      
Treated## 
High_Know 0.524 0.229 -0.574 -0.107 0.152 
 (0.186) (0.475) (0.422) (0.787) (0.129) 
      
Constant 5.853*** 4.676*** 5.588*** 5.382*** 0.647*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 
p-values in parentheses 







Table 5: Heterogeneous Effect III: Self-Monitoring Propensity 
 Dependent Variable 
 ACCOUNTABLE REASONABLE SERVICE DISHONEST ACCEPTABLE 
Treated -0.848** 0.274 -0.325 0.323 0.186+ 
 (0.006) (0.445) (0.168) (0.132) (0.062) 
      
Low_SM 0.0263 0.500 2.10e-17 0.632* 0.316** 
 (0.932) (0.190) (1.000) (0.014) (0.009) 
      
Treated## 
Low_SM 0.736
+ -1.378** 0.271 -0.295 -0.364* 
 (0.056) (0.003) (0.185) (0.216) (0.040) 
      
Constant 5.526*** 4.368*** 5.789*** 5.105*** 0.421*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 
p-values in parentheses 





Table 6 Confidence in Governments 
 Mean Std.  N. 
Central Government 8.17 2.19 3763 
Local Government (County/City) 6.54 2.65 3702 




Note: Data from World Value Survey VI. The sample size is 1750 for the Chinese case. The independent variable (x- 
axis) asked respondents their confidence in the government and the dependent variable (y-axis) asked to what extents 
they think “cheating on taxes if you have a chance” is justifiable (Likert scale from 1 to 10. 1 means completely 
unjustifiable and 10 means completely justifiable). I run an OLS model with robust standard error.   
 40 
 
Note: This coefficient plot is for the balance test of pretreatment covariates with the pooled data combining MBA and 
Non-MBA respondents (N=119). The confidence intervals were estimated by logit regression model with robust 
standard error at the significance level of .05 
 
Note: The coefficients are estimated by bivariate regression with robust standard error at .05 significance level. 
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Note: Both coefficient plots used the significance level of .05 to construct to confidence interval. The upper plot 
included only MBA respondents, my first wave of data collection while the below plot pooled both MBA and non-
MBA respondents. As expected, when the sample size increased, the estimation improved its precision. Although the 
coefficient of DISHONEST changed the direction, the treatment variable is not statistically significant. It also merits 
noting that the pooled data consist both MBA and non-MBA respondents so, strictly speaking, the increase in sample 
size may contain heterogeneity. 
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Figure 5: The Proportion of Industry and Function of the MBA Students from CEBS  
 
 
Note: Figure 5 is from CEBS MBA 
program. It details the proportion of 
industry and function of their current 
MBA students before they were 





APPENDIX A: VIGNETTES IN THE PRETEST 
 
Message 1: Role Perception 
Just for your information, according to several scholarly research, local congress delegates have recently become 
increasingly responsive to ordinary people’s interests in their locality. As shown in a large-scale survey of more than 
5000 local congress delegates, when asking these delegates to choose among statements closest to their own view of 
the relationship between delegates and ordinary people, 60% of them chose “delegates should side with the majority 
of the ordinary people in the locality because these people best understand their own interests.  
 
This result seems very different than before: Previously, scholars in the 1980s-1990s found that most local congress 
delegates emphasized that they are party agent, thinking of congress membership as merely an honorary status. 
Currently, in this survey, only 23% of them chose “delegates should obey the decisions of the Communist party 
organization” in the survey. 
 
Message 2: Perceived Responsibility 
Just for your information, according to several scholarly research, local congress delegates have recently become 
increasingly responsive to ordinary people’s interests in their locality. As shown in a large-scale survey of more than 
5000 local congress delegates, when asking these delegates to choose among nine tasks that they treat as their most 
important responsibility, more than half of them chose “doing practical things and solving concrete problems for the 
mass public”.  
 
This seems very different than before. Previously, delegates’ main responsibility was “reporting upward the 
opinions of people and transmitting downward the official policies”. Currently, only 7.4% of these delegates 
consider this choice as their primary responsibility in the survey. 
 
Message 3: Delegate Activism 
Just for your information, according to several scholarly research, local congress delegates have recently become 
increasingly responsive to ordinary people’s interests in their locality. As shown in a large-scale survey of more than 
5000 local congress delegates, they show greater extra-legislative, everyday responsiveness in daily life. Currently, 
they usually respond to people’s contacting for practical issues, such as social order problem; they also advocate 
with local government officials for providing ordinary people in their locality with public services, such as road and 
irrigation system.    
 
This seems very different than before. Previously, congress delegates often were viewed as entirely irrelevant in 
public good provisions and had no desire to deliver local public services. Compared to journalists’ interviews in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s that showed delegates had no concept of what they were supposed to be doing, local 
congress delegates are playing a more active role in public good provisions. 
 
Message 4: Electoral Incentives 
Just for your information, according to several scholarly research, local congress delegates have recently become 
increasingly responsive to ordinary people’s interests in their locality. As shown in a large-scale survey of more than 
5000 local congress delegates, since township and county congress delegates are nominated and elected in direct 
elections, scholars found that these congress delegates have a strong desire to build personal reputation by 
representing ordinary people’s interests. Currently, congress delegates fluently speak a language that manifests this 
desire, such as voting district, constituency, and constituent interests; they also try to advocate with government for 
delivering public services deemed as most important by ordinary people in their locality. 
 
This seems very different than before. Previously, delegates in township and county congress were not nominated 
and elected by people; instead, they were selected by the party as an honorary status. In this regard, congress 




APPENDIX B: PRETEST RESULTS 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Role Perception 45 2.511111 1.057919 1 4 
Delegate Activism 45 3.022222 1.196375 1 4 
Perceived Responsibility 45 2.288889 1.014043 1 4 
Election Incentives 45 2.622222 1.050733 1 4 
Note: Data from the pretest. Sample is from 45 undergraduate students from the Shanghai University of Finance and 
Economics. They were asked to rank the four vignettes based on how successful they think a given one in conveying 






APPENDIX C: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Z1. What is your gender? 
 
Z2. What year were you born?  
 
Z3. Before you are in this master program, what was your occupation?                                        
 
We are interested in your opinion about paying taxes and public services. There is no right or wrong answer. 
We are simply interested in your opinion. Please read the following message before answering the questions. 
 
[Control Group] 
People’s Congress is an essential state institution in China. Each year, local congress delegates meet at least once to 
discuss public policies. 
 
[Treatment Group] 
People’s Congress is an essential state institution in China. Each year, local congress delegates meet at least once to 
discuss public policies. We want to let you know that, according to a recent survey of 5000 local delegates, local 
congress delegates become more willing to respond people’s interests in their locality. Besides, they also take an 
initiative to advocate with local governments for offering public services deemed as important by local people, such 
as road, irrigation system, and social order. This is different than before in that congress delegates seldom delivered 
public services previously. But, now, since township and county congress delegates are nominated and elected in 
direct elections, they need to respond people to gain personal reputation. Yangzhou Municipal and Taizhou Wenling 
congresses are concrete examples. 
 
A0. In general, do you think to what extent local congress delegates are willing to respond ordinary people’s 
interests [Manipulation check]?  
 
I’m going to ask you some questions. For your answer, 1 means you completely disagree with the statement; 7 
means you completely agree with the statement of the right. If your views fall somewhat in between, you can 
choose any number in between [Tax Morale].  
 
A1. Everyone who cheats on their taxes should be held accountable [ACCOUNTABLE]. 
 
A2. People should just have to pay what they feel is a fair amount of taxes to governments [REASONABLE]. 
 
A3. Governments should take public opinion into account while making fiscal-policy decisions, even if this may 
spend more time.  
 
A4. Once paying taxes, people have the right to discuss how governments spend their revenues. 
 
I am now going to ask you about two different actions that some other people take. For each of the following, 
please tell me to what extent you think the action is justifiable. 
 
A5. Not honestly paying for the services they receive from government [SERVICE] 
 
A6. Cheating on reporting actual profits to the tax authorities if having a chance [DISHONEST] 
 
A7. Let’s talk about tax fraud. We would like to know which of these expressions you agree with the most 
[ACCEPTABLE]:  
[1] Tax fraud is unacceptable under any circumstance. It is a matter of principle and fairness.  
[2] Fraud and taxes are inseparable, everyone evades taxes to some extent, and this is how the system is sustainable. 
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Now I am going to ask you some short questions such as you might see on mass media. Some questions may 
be more difficult than others. If you don’t know the answer it’s not a problem. Just select “don’t know” and 
move to the next question [Political Knowledge]. 
  
B1. Who is NOT the current members of the Politburo Standing Committee? 
 
B2. Do you happen to know, other than CCP, how many political parties are there in China? 
 
B3. Do you happen to know when the central government implemented tax-sharing reform? 
 
B4. Where is the headquarter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?  
  
B5. Who is the current chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress? 
 
B6. Who is the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom? 
   
Next, I am going to read you a series of statements. Please tell me how well they each apply to you. For each 
statement, tell me if you strongly agree with it, somewhat agree with it, somewhat disagree with it or strongly 
disagree with it [SM scale].  
 
D1. I put on a show to impress or entertain others (positive-keyed)  
D2. I would probably make a good actor (positive-keyed) 
D3. In a group of people, I am rarely the center of attention (negative-keyed)  
D4. At a party, I let others keep the jokes and stories going (negative-keyed)  
D5. I can make speeches on the spot, even on topics about which I have almost no information (positive-keyed)  
D6. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people (negative-keyed)  
 
E1. What is your party affiliation? 
 
E2. Are you married? 
 
E3. What is your monthly income category? 
 
E4. What is your current city of residence?  
 





APPENDIX D: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE KEY VARIABLES 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female 119 .512605 .5019546 0 1 
Age 119 29.38655 4.841749 22 51 
CCP 119 .3865546 .4890191 0 1 
Income Category 119 6.352941 2.275843 1 10 
Manipulation 119 3.117647 .8454912 1 5 
Accountable 119 5.310924 1.759949 1 7 
Reasonable 119 4.420168 2.027338 1 7 
Public Service 119 5.697479 1.559849 1 7 
Dishonest 119 5.571429 1.576154 1 7 
Acceptable 119 .605042 .4909087 0 1 
Political Knowledge 119 2.268908 1.406387 0 6 
Self-Monitoring 119 14.0084 1.997862 9 19 
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